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Abstract. Access by SMEs to finance is constrained by demand-side weaknesses. Most 
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„sell‟ themselves and their businesses to potential investors. These weaknesses, in turn, 
compromise the effectiveness of supply-side interventions, such as initiatives to stimulate 
business angels or which create public sector venture capital funds. This has highlighted the need 
for investment readiness programmes which seek to increase the pool of investable businesses. 
This paper reviews the design and delivery of investment readiness programmes in the UK and 
draws out lessons for best practice. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
High growth firms – so called gazelles – are recognised as having a disproportionate impact on 
economic development and job creation (Shane, 2009). It is further recognised that many firms 
with the ambition and potential for growth need to access appropriate forms of finance, notably 
venture capital, if this potential is to be realised. Intervention by governments to improve the 
access of growing SMEs to finance is almost entirely focused on supply side measures, typically 
by seeking to stimulate business angel investment activity and through the creation of new 
investment vehicles. The implicit assumption of this approach is that constraints on access to 
finance arise because of deficiencies in the supply of capital. However, there is now belated 
recognition that access to finance can also be hindered by the existence of weaknesses on the 
demand side. Clearly, if there are demand-side deficiencies then this will compromise the 
effectiveness of supply-side interventions. Either it will prevent the fund from becoming fully 
invested, or it will make bad investments on account of the poor quality of deal flow with 
implication for its financial performance. There is considerable  evidence, particularly amongst 
the business angel community, that investors are frustrated by the low quality of the investment 
opportunities that they see and so are unable to invest as frequently or as much as they would 
like (e.g. Mason and Harrison, 1999; 2002; Paul et al, 2003). Moreover, the existence of business 
angel networks, whose objective is to improve the efficiency of the market by „introducing‟ 
investors to entrepreneurs seeking finance, and vice versa, has not improved the ability of 
investors to invest because many of the businesses that they have put in front of investors are not 
been investment ready (Blatt and Riding, 1996; Mason and Harrison, 1996a; 1999; 2002; Zu 
Knyphausen-Aufseβ and Westphal, 2008). This has led to the recognition that a supply side 
approach to address access to finance issues must be accompanied by demand-side initiatives 
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which enhance the quality of deal flow. These considerations have led to the development of 
investment ready programmes.  
 
Investment readiness is a relatively new and therefore unfamiliar form of intervention. Best 
practice is therefore still evolving. Our aim in this paper is to critically review the experience of 
some early investment ready programmes in the UK and to highlight emerging issues in their 
design. The next section examines in more detail what is meant by „investment readiness‟. 
Section 3 discusses the design of investment readiness programmes. Section 4 provides an 
overview of the way in which many investment ready schemes have been implemented. Section 
5 reviews the lessons to be drawn from evaluation studies and proposes some elements of 
emerging best practice.  
 
 
2. DEFINING ‘INVESTMENT READINESS’ 
Investment readiness is generally used in the context of raising external equity finance. There are 
three dimensions of investment readiness: equity aversion; investability; and presentational 
failings. We look at each in turn.  
 
The first concerns the entrepreneur's attitude towards equity finance. Consistent with the 
„pecking order‟ hypothesis (Myers, 1984), there is a high level of equity aversion amongst SMEs 
(Hutchinson, 1995; Howorth, 2001; Oakey, 2007), with most business owners with aspirations to 
grow their businesses reluctant to surrender ownership and control. This attitude is reflected in 
the vocabulary of business owners who often refer to the process of raising equity finance as 
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requiring them to „give away‟ part of their business. Equity aversion, in turn, may be related to 
the entrepreneur‟s lack of information about the characteristics and availability of alternative 
sources of finance (Van Auken, 2001).The consequence is that many potentially investable 
projects do not come forward as potential recipients for venture capital. It is argued that with a 
better understanding of the role of different sources of finance in business development more 
entrepreneurs would consider seeking equity finance. 
 
The second, and core, dimension of investment readiness concerns the investability of those 
businesses that do seek external finance. The high rejection rates of business angels and venture 
capital funds (Riding et al, 1993; Mason and Harrison, 1994; Lumme et al 1998; Stedler and 
Peters, 2003) clearly indicates that most businesses that seek external finance do not meet the 
requirements of external investors. The investment decision-making process involves two stages. 
At the first stage the opportunity is assessed against the investor‟s investment parameters - for 
example, sector, stage of business, size of investment, location.  The initial concern of business 
angels when appraising an investment opportunity is the „goodness of fit‟ between the 
opportunity and their own personal investment criteria. Key considerations include whether the 
investor is interested or knows anything about the industry or market, the amount of finance 
required and its location. Investors reject investment opportunities which do not meet their 
investment parameters. Lack of information – or failure to seek out the information that does 
exist – explains why entrepreneurs make approaches to inappropriate investors. Admittedly, 
given the anonymity of most business angels it is much harder to identify their interests in 
advance of approaching them. Investors then screen those businesses which meet their 
investment parameters.  
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Investors reject investment opportunities essentially for one of two reasons: because of 
shortcomings of the entrepreneur and because of shortcomings of the business (Feeney et al, 
1999). Shortcomings in the attributes of entrepreneurs include: lack of knowledge and expertise 
to turn the idea into a viable business; unrealistic expectations (e.g. overly optimistic, 
unsubstantiated); and personal qualities (lack of integrity, vision or commitment, high need for 
control of the business). Shortcomings of the business include: poor management team (e.g. 
balance, experience, discipline, teamwork); poor profit potential for the level of risk; 
undercapitalised; and insufficient information provided.   
 
A study of deals rejected by a UK business angel investment group highlighted three dominant 
reasons: weaknesses in the entrepreneur/management team; marketing and market-related 
factors, notably flawed or incomplete marketing strategies; and financial considerations, notably 
flawed financial projections. Most opportunities were rejected for just one or two reasons. 
Opportunities which failed to get past the initial screening stage tended to be rejected because of 
the accumulation of deficiencies whereas those rejected after detailed investigation tended to be 
rejected because of the discovery of a single fundamental flaw (Mason and Harrison, 1996b).  
 
A study of investment decision making by UK business angels based on business plan 
summaries indicated that they were turned off by businesses that lack focus; where 
comprehensive and credible market information is lacking; that operate in highly competitive 
markets; and lack a unique selling point (USP)  (i.e. „me too‟ products and services). Investors 
wanted to understand the way that the product or service is distinctive or superior to that of the 
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competition and how any competitive advantage will be sustained.  They also placed 
considerable emphasis on the experience and track-record of the entrepreneur, his/her 
commitment, the upside potential of the business, and the use to which the finance that is sought 
will be put (Mason and Rogers, 1997).  
 
Another study of UK business angels reported that the main deficiencies in the proposals that 
they see were, first, business plans which contain unrealistic assumptions or information that is 
not credible and, second, entrepreneur/ management teams which lack credibility (Mason and 
Harrison, 2002). Significant, although less frequently cited weaknesses included insufficient 
information provided, business concept requires further development and limited growth 
prospects of the business.  
 
An ERDF-supported seed capital fund in Scotland reported that  
"The majority [of investment opportunities] were declined on the basis of a 
suspect business plan or business model … The most common characteristic was 
the inability of the applicant to demonstrate a credible revenue model. They could 
not show that the company could attract sufficient paying customers to cover the 
costs of the business. Behind this generalisation are a range of problems. The 
inability to demonstrate any unique selling point - why would anyone purchase 
your product? The inability to demonstrate a route to market - how are you going 
to get your product to a customer? The inability to demonstrate that there were 
sufficient potential customers to warrant the new business. Very often the plans 
concentrated on the product or technology developed by the applicant, but little or 
no consideration had been given to the costs of marketing, distribution or 
customer servicing" (cited in Mason and Harrison, 2004).  
 
So, here again information failure is critical. Relatively few business owners understand what is 
needed to attract external equity capital and how to meet the requirements of external investors.  
 
 
 
6 
 
The third dimension of investment readiness is presentational failings. Even if the underlying 
proposition is sound a business may still fail to raise finance if the business plan is poorly 
constructed and presented. This includes shortcomings in business plans and other written 
documents that are aimed at investors and also deficiencies in „pitches‟ at investment forums. As 
noted above, investors are frustrated by missing information in business plans, particularly when 
it relates to any of the generic questions that investors ask of any investment proposal (Mason 
and Rogers, 1997; Mason and Harrison, 2002). In the case of verbal pitches, Mason and Harrison 
(2003) demonstrate that a poor oral presentation is likely to generate a negative reaction amongst 
potential investors. In their case study the presentation that was reviewed by investors had two 
fundamental failings. First, it was preoccupied with the product/technology, which was 
confusing to those investors who did not have the appropriate background. Second, it failed to 
make the business case. The need for the product was not demonstrated, the benefits to the 
customers were not explained and the potential customers were not identified. Significantly, poor 
presentation was interpreted by some investors as a warning signal for the entrepreneur‟s wider 
lack of competence, with one investor posing the rhetorical question: “if he can‟t sell to 
investors, how can he sell to customers?”  Building on this study, Clark (2008) also found a clear 
and statistically significant relationship between business angels‟ perception of the quality and 
content of the entrepreneurial presentation and their decision on whether or not to pursue the 
investment opportunity. In other words, business angels‟ judgments about what constituted a 
pursuable investment opportunity were based not just on the investment-related content of the 
presentation and their perception of the entrepreneurs who had made the presentation but also for 
the way in which this content had been delivered. The clear implication is that entrepreneurs who 
do not sell themselves and the substance of their investment opportunity are less likely to 
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succeed in convincing investors to seriously consider, let alone pursue, their investment 
opportunity. In contrast, entrepreneurs who can tell a convincing and compelling story to 
potential investors are more likely to be successful in raising finance (Shepherd and Douglas, 
1999).  
 
In summary, the reasons why businesses are not investment ready is primarily due to information 
failure (Marsden Jacobs, 1995). Entrepreneurs do not know about the role of equity finance, are 
unaware of what is involved in raising finance, what is required to attract equity investors, nor 
how to convincingly articulate their investment proposal to investors. Entrepreneurs need 
information and advice on the advantages of raising equity finance, what it means to be 
„investment ready‟ and how to become investment ready.  
 
 
3. INVESTMENT READINESS PROGRAMMES 
This evidence makes a compelling case that investment readiness has to be addressed in any 
joined-up policies on access to finance by SMEs. The effectiveness of supply-side and other 
forms of intervention (e.g. business angel networks) will be compromised unless efforts are also 
made to address the investment readiness of the businesses that are the intended targets of these 
interventions.  The central objective of investment readiness programmes is to raise the quality 
of investment opportunities. So how should they be designed? An intervention that is designed to 
enhance investment readiness amongst the SME population must address all of the components 
that influence the quantity and, in particular, the quality of demand for equity finance, namely 
equity aversion, investability and presentational issues. Influenced by some early Australian 
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programmes (Marsden Jacobs, 1995; Ernst and Young/Centre for Innovation and Enterprise, 
1997) Mason and Harrison (2001) proposed that a programme to enhance „investment readiness‟ 
amongst the SME population should involve two elements. The first is information provision. 
Entrepreneurs do not know about the advantages of equity finance, what is required to attract 
equity investors, the criteria that investors use to assess investment opportunities nor how to sell 
their investment proposal to investors. The second is support - helping entrepreneurs to meet 
these standards. The programme itself would take the form of a series of seminars, workshops 
and one-to-one consultancy sessions encompassing the following five elements: an information 
seminar; an investment ready review; an investment ready development programme; an investment ready 
presentation review; and investment networking (Figure 1). Mason and Harrison (2001) further 
suggested that the programme would require to be customised to reflect the requirements of firms at 
different stages of growth and development and different classes of investor (e.g. business angel vs. 
venture capital fund). However, this requirement has subsequently been questioned (SQW, 2004: 17). 
 
The first element is a broadly targeted Information Seminar designed to fill the knowledge gap 
about equity as an alternative source of finance for SMEs at all stages of development. This 
would address the following issues (following Ernst and Young/Centre for Innovation and 
Enterprise, 1997): 
• what equity is and the benefits it may bring 
• the limitations of debt funding 
• the circumstances in which it should be considered 
• the different types of equity providers in the market place and their specific focus 
• how to access the right investor and who are the intermediaries who may provide 
assistance in finding appropriate investors 
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Figure 1. A model of an Investment Ready programme (Mason and Harrison, 2001)
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• equity investors‟ evaluation process and decision-making criteria 
• how to present information which focuses on the investor perspective of the 
opportunity 
• determining realistic funding needs for the future 
• what to expect in relation to the equity parties control and legal safeguards for the 
future 
• risk and return aspects of equity investment and the determination of „value‟ 
 
These seminars would be targeted at businesses that are seeking to grow or are already growing, 
and those that are seeking to commercialise an innovative process or technology. There is a need 
to reach entrepreneurs at an early stage to enable them to incorporate equity funding in their 
planning process: identifying and planning for the most appropriate financial and ownership 
structure for the business is critical to its potential future success. 
 
This lack of understanding of how to be investment ready also exists within the SME small 
business support network, both private and public, particularly local, small scale advisers and 
service providers. Their knowledge tends to be confined to debt funding options and therefore 
reinforces the aversion to equity amongst their clients (Ernst and Young/Centre for Innovation 
and Enterprise, 1997). These seminars should therefore also be open to small business service 
providers (accountants, lawyers, consultants) to bring them up to the standard needed to be 
capable of supporting high growth ventures.  
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The second element involves focusing on those attendees at the basic seminars/ workshops who 
put themselves forward as candidates for equity finance. These businesses would undergo an 
Investment Ready Review at which they would be benchmarked on a one-to-one basis for their 
suitability to raise equity finance. This would cover such issues as (following Ernst and 
Young/Centre for Innovation and Enterprise, 1997): 
• what are the entrepreneur‟s aspirations? 
• what is the entrepreneur‟s attitude to ownership and control? 
• are their books in order? 
• are the owner‟s personal affairs separate from the business? 
• does the business have an integrated software package? 
• how experienced is the entrepreneur and management team? 
• does the entrepreneur know the market? 
• has the product been developed to the point of functioning prototype? 
• is the product/service proprietary or can it be protected? 
• has the product/service been tested in the market place? 
• how competitive is the product/service? 
• can the entrepreneur provide a reasonable and realistic business plan? 
• can the entrepreneur articulate how the finance will be utilised? 
• what is the likely rate of return on an investment? 
• is there the likelihood of an exit strategy? 
Businesses which do not receive a positive assessment will be directed to appropriate forms of 
support; they will have the opportunity to re-join the programme once the specific deficiencies 
have been addressed. 
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Those businesses that receive a positive assessment will proceed to the third element which is an 
Investment Ready Development Programme which is intended to address issues raised by the 
review. The objective is to accelerate companies to the stage of positive cash flow as soon as 
possible on the grounds that such companies are easier to „sell‟ to investors than those that are 
still at the ideas stage. This stage, which is likely to take several months, will cover issues such 
as the management team, boards, intellectual property, market analysis, market positioning and 
market validation, business models, competition, differentiation and barriers to entry, future 
products/services, and financial planning. It could involve accessing other forms of business 
support such as innovation grants, proof-of-concept funds and CEO-designate schemes. Such 
schemes – which most countries offer in one form or another – are, in effect, addressing aspects 
of investment readiness although are not labelled as such. It can be argued that the effectiveness 
of these schemes are likely to be enhanced when incorporated as part of a holistic investment 
readiness programme. 
 
The fourth element is an Investment Presentation Review to assist companies to prepare a 
„winning‟ investment presentation. Knowing how to present an opportunity effectively to 
potential investors can be regarded as one specific aspect of being „investor ready‟ as it requires 
an understanding of what (different types of) investors look for in an opportunity and an ability 
to anticipate and address the concerns of investors. Central to this presentation is the use of 
information which demonstrates and signals personal and organisational competence and the 
entrepreneur's abilities and motivations.  This includes an awareness of deal structures and 
valuation. As noted above, presentational failings – notably not providing sufficient information 
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- are an important reason why opportunities are rejected by investors. Providing coaching in this 
area is therefore critical to effective equity finance raising. 
 
The final element is Investment Networking to provide a link between the businesses that have 
completed the programme and potential investors. This function is undertaken in many countries 
by business angel networks. However, it could also be undertaken by networks based on 
university and business school alumni associations, or other investor-entrepreneur networking 
events. 
 
In view of the importance of competent delivery, Mason and Harrison (2001) recommended that 
the programme is delivered by consultants and experienced practitioners who have close 
familiarity with the requirements and expectations of business angels and other early stage 
investors rather than by bureaucrats (or those perceived as such). 
 
Mason and Harrison (2001) also emphasised the time scale and costs involved. Because of the 
need to change both culture and practice, investment readiness needs to be long term; developing 
investment ready businesses is not a short term process either for the businesses themselves or 
for the programme as a whole. Investment readiness programmes will also be expensive. Public 
sector agencies cannot expect the businesses that are the target audience for the programme to be 
able to afford the full costs of participating in the programme. 
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4. INVESTMENT READINESS PROGRAMMES IN PRACTICE: AN OVERVIEW 
Despite the compelling argument for investment readiness programmes to complement supply-
side initiatives they are still relatively uncommon. Certainly there are many types of initiatives 
that address aspects of investment readiness. However, interventions that seek to address 
investment readiness in a holistic way remain limited. A recent mapping exercise of training 
provision for investors and entrepreneurs across Europe identified just 18 investment-ready 
programmes spread across six European countries (Ready for Equity, 2008).  
 
A review of investment ready programmes reveals considerable heterogeneity in practice. First, 
there are differences in their starting point and orientation, with many focusing primarily on 
either the business plan or the pitch, or both. Second, programmes differ in terms of whether 
they are generic, and delivered through workshops, or company specific and delivered by 
mentoring, or both. As the model suggests, both are required, with individual company support 
becoming critical in the later stages. Third, there are differences in the emphasis given to the 
investment process itself (e.g. legals, transaction process, investment instruments, shareholder 
agreement, etc), with most programmes giving such issues only cursory attention. This requires 
much greater attention in investment readiness programmes. Fourth, there are variations in the 
length of such programmes, ranging from a couple of hours to several days. Fifth, there are 
signs of emerging diversity of focus, with examples of investment ready programmes targeted at 
women and at third sector (i.e. social) businesses and at deliverers of such programmes. One 
common element is that such programmes are generally linked to a funding mechanism.  
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A number of observations can be made. First, many so-called investment ready programmes, 
often run by commercial businesses, focus primarily or exclusively on either the business plan or 
the pitch, or both. This is problematic. As stressed throughout this paper, investment readiness is 
much more than preparing a business plan or developing a slick presentation. Moreover, the 
value of investing 100 to 200 hours in writing a business plan is increasingly being questioned 
(Gumpert, 2003; Kawasaki, 2004). Investors are placing less emphasis on the business plan. 
They are unlikely to read a business plan at the outset. However, they will listen and react to a 
pitch. It is therefore more important to develop a short, punchy power point presentation that 
provides answers to the key questions that an investor will want to know about the business. In 
addition these programmes often give too much emphasis to financials – business angels take a 
fairly cynical view of finances, believing that, in the words of one investor, “accountants … can 
tweak the assumptions and come up with any figure. So it's the last thing I look at."  Investors 
will not look at the financials if the narrative does not stack up (Mason and Rogers, 1996). 
Accordingly, programmes which focus just on these elements are unlikely to be successful. 
 
Second, a number of investment ready self-assessment products have been developed. These are 
software tools designed on the basis of how investors evaluate business plans to provide an 
automated assessment a business‟s investment readiness. They are positioned at the Investment 
Development Review stage and offer an alternative to a personalised assessment of their 
attractiveness to potential investors. An example is the Business Investment Readiness Tool 
(BIRT) developed by Finance Tree in North East England (www.ask-birt.com). Businesses 
provide information on the following:  the benefit and impact of their product/service; the 
development and protectability of the product/service; market & customers; strategic-
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competitive plans; the entrepreneur; the  management team; business financials; the deal being 
sought (Table 1). The feedback which businesses receive normally comprises numerical scores 
which compares its relative strengths and weaknesses on a range of dimensions of the business  
and its management team plus an automatically-generated bespoke report which includes advice  
on how to improve the attractiveness of the business to investors, which together enable an 
entrepreneur to assess their strengths and weaknesses before seeking to raise finance (Figure 2).  
 
Table 1. The main assessed sections in the Ask-BIRT™ Business Investment Readiness Tool, 
with a sample question (from 60) for each section.  
 
 Product – Benefits & Impact 
Which  attributes do you think are a substantial 
improvement in performance/cost/price of similar 
products/service currently on the market?  
 
 Product – Development & Protectability 
How complete is your prototype development?  
[100%=fully functional and tested product, all parts 
patented; 0%=not built yet, not researched] 
 
 The Market & Customers 
Is there an established distribution channel? [Either set 
up by yourself or by others] 
[If “yes”:] Do you have access to this channel?  
[If “no”] How are you going to get your product/service 
to market? 
 
 Strategic-Competitive 
What is your business model? – That is, how are you 
going to make money out of this venture? 
Do you have any other products/services that are 
forthcoming in your portfolio? 
 
 The Entrepreneur 
Do you have any other experienced & successful 
business persons whom you can call upon for advice or 
contacts? 
How comfortable are you selling yourself or ideas to 
others? 
 
 The Management Team 
Do you have at least one “star” or 
“heavyweight”/expert/industry veteran/guru on your 
management team? 
 
 The Financials 
What have you spent your money on so far? 
Where did you get the money to fund these activities? 
 
 The Deal  
What returns can you realistically expect from this 
venture?  
Over what period of time? 
What is the maximum proportion of this business you 
willing to trade for equity? 
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Figure 2. A Sample of a Bespoke report generated by Ask-BIRT™ 
 
 
It is important that these investment assessment tools should not be seen as a low cost alternative 
to personalised approaches which assess businesses in terms of their investment readiness. First, 
they require considerable investment to develop. The BIRT tool required one person-year to 
develop plus substantial computing resources to operationalise. Second, they are not designed to 
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replace one-to-one interaction. Rather, they are intended as a precursor for follow-up 
interventions. In the case of BIRT, each entrepreneur is invited to attend a post-assessment 
consultation, with the output report providing a platform for further courses, workshops and 
tailored assistance that are offered by Finance Tree Ltd. The Venture Ready™ programme feeds 
into a mentoring programme. 
 
Third, and a further area of concern, is that there is often no follow-up to the Investment 
Readiness Review and the Industrial Readiness Development Programme, with the entrepreneur 
generally left to take the initiative in addressing the issues raised. Moreover, specialist assistance 
is often required to remove the barriers to investment that are identified by the expert diagnosis 
and the costs involved are likely to be beyond what the entrepreneur can afford and what a 
prospective investor is willing to spend. This highlights the need for businesses to be able to 
access appropriate support either to become investment ready or to enable a potential investor to 
clarify particular issues that are critical to their investment decision. In such cases investors will 
be deterred by the costs (typically the time involved) of undertaking the necessary investigations 
in order to assess whether the business has the potential to become an attractive investment 
opportunity. Having identified the problems that prevent such businesses from being investment 
ready, there are likely to be further costs – both time inputs to provide the necessary level of 
support and fees to employ specialists (e.g. legal advice to resolve an IP issue) - to fix them. 
Potential investors are not prepared to make the necessary investment because of the risk that the 
business will remain uninvestable even after the outstanding issue(s) is addressed. The rational 
response of investors is therefore to reject these opportunities and seek out others that involve 
lower investigative and support costs (Douglas and Shepherd, 2002). Thus, businesses that are 
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participants in investment readiness schemes, and which are deemed (e.g. by a potential investor) 
to be potentially investable but require significant additional support to get to the point where 
they could attract funds, need to be able to access to small amounts of funding to cover the time 
of the potential investor or to access the necessary expertise to address those impediments to 
funding that are fixable. 
 
A good illustration of this type of intervention is an EU-funded programme developed by LINC 
Scotland which, in its current form, enables companies seeking finance to obtain funding to 
cover the cost of an agreed programme of deliverables that are identified by the solutions 
provider - typically a potential investor – or by LINC Scotland itself (Mason and Harrison, 
2004). This is designed to remunerate the investor‟s time (usually a business angel) plus any 
expert inputs in the form of IP protection, legal costs or specialist external due diligence (e.g. on 
technology) to solve specific problems.  The maximum grant is now £15,000 per company: this 
covers 70% of total costs (half of which is provided by the EU, with the remainder provided by 
the professional firms which sponsor the scheme) with companies providing the balance. Should 
an investment occur the grant becomes convertible to LINC Scotland equity in the company on 
the same terms as the main external investors. LINC Scotland will exit at the same time as the 
other investors. 
 
 
5.  INVESTMENT READINESS PROGRAMMES: EVALUATIONS 
This section probes more deeply into the functioning and impact of investment readiness 
programmes. It is based on three sources of evidence: (i) an evaluation of the UK Government‟s 
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Investment Readiness Demonstration Projects; (ii) an overview of an investment readiness 
programme introduced by the University of Warwick Science Park; and (iii) an evaluation of the 
Finance and Business Programme delivered by Finance Tree Ltd in North East England. We 
draw upon this evidence for important insights into the design and delivery of investment ready 
programmes. 
 
i) Evaluation of the UK Government’s Investment Readiness Demonstration Projects 
The Mason and Harrison (2001) paper prompted the UK‟s Small Business Service to introduce a 
pilot programme of Investment Readiness Demonstration Projects. Following a competitive 
tender six bids for projects were funded along with an existing programme („Fit4Finance‟) to roll 
it out more widely. The new projects all started in 2002, with Fit4Finance established a year 
earlier, and were evaluated in 2004 by SQW Limited (SQW, 2004).  
 
The projects varied in their design and focus. This was deliberate because one of the aims of the 
Demonstration Projects was to test a number of approaches to investment readiness. 
Nevertheless, most covered all of the elements in the „Mason-Harrison programme‟ outlined 
earlier, although there were variations in how these were delivered (Table 2). One variant took 
the form of intensive and continuous support over a sustained period whereas the other provided 
injections of support at various points as the business progressed on its journey to becoming 
investment ready. A further distinction was between delivery through group-based workshop 
structures and delivery on an individual basis by one or a series of advisors. Both structures 
offered benefits, were not mutually exclusive and when offered in combination tended to be 
complementary.  
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Table 2. An Overview of the Approaches Adopted by the UK’s Investment Demonstration 
Projects  
 
Project components 
 
Description 
 
Information seminar 
 
To provide information on a range of issues relating to investment, generally 
presented by specialists. The audience included both business owners and 
intermediaries providing business support and professionals (e.g. accountants, 
lawyers) 
 
Investment ready review Most projects offered a diagnostic session where a project member carried out a 
review of the business, as assessment of its need for finance and whether it was a 
candidate for equity finance. If the business was judged not to have the potential to 
raise equity finance it was signposted to an alternative source of support. The 
diagnostic review ranged between 1.5 hours/half a day meeting to a more structured 
and in-depth assessment covering a much longer period of time. Those businesses 
identified as appropriate candidates for equity finance then progressed either to one-
to-one support or a group based programme, or a combination of both. 
 
Investment ready 
development programme 
There was less consistency in how the intensive support was delivered. Where it was 
through one-to-one support the emphasis was on identifying and addressing  gaps 
and deficiencies in the business plan before being presented to a potential investor or 
developing a business plan where one did not exist. In some cases support would 
also focus on particular issues that required to be addressed (e.g. review of marketing 
strategy, recruitment of new team members). In other cases this support was 
delivered through a combination of mentor support and workshops. 
 
Investment ready 
presentation review 
This typically took the form of a mock panel presentation where the business could 
rehearse its presentation in a safe environment and receive feedback. Panellists 
normally comprised members of the investment community. Generally panel 
members were provided with a copy of the business plan before the session and 
interrogated the entrepreneur after the presentation. 
 
Investment networking Most of the projects had strong relationships with investors, investor groups or 
investment funds and so were able to provide introductions to potential investors. 
Source: compiled from information in SQW (2004) 
 
The projects were judged by the consultants to have achieved additionally. However, the 
Consultants noted that it was problematic for the business clients to make an accurate judgement 
on the extent of additionality because they were being asked to reflect on their likely behaviour 
in the absence of the programme, but with the benefit of hindsight of experiencing a project 
designed to raise awareness of the benefits of equity. Certainly the businesses could not have 
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afforded the full cost of the intensive, sophisticated support that they received nor would they 
have had the exposure to a range of specialists and investment candidates or the introductions to 
the wide range of potential investors in the absence of the scheme. Positive impacts were 
identified in awareness raising, personal, business development and financial benefits, and 
funding success, with the participating businesses reporting 96 funding deals, with others still in 
the process of equity negotiation at the time of the evaluation. The Consultants concluded that 
the demand for such an intervention appears to exist, and where the projects have been delivered 
effectively they have achieved positive impacts.  
 
The evaluation also drew out a number of important lessons for the design and delivery of 
investment readiness programmes. First, they are not a short-term intervention. Investment 
readiness programmes require long-term commitment over several months to support businesses 
to the point where they are ready to seek equity finance. It is therefore essential that sufficient 
time is allowed for businesses to complete the programme. It also takes time for such 
programmes to become established and embedded in networks. Second, the costs of delivery of 
such programmes are fairly high and the client group – start-up and early stage businesses – are 
poorly positioned to pay. Indeed, none of the projects recovered the full cost of delivery; it 
therefore seems unlikely that such intensive and specialized investment readiness programmes 
could become self-financing. It follows that the public sector must subsidise such programmes if 
they are deemed to make an important contribution to the emergence of entrepreneur-led, high 
growth businesses and in turn to economic development. Third, continuous awareness raising is 
necessary to recruit businesses to the programme. Fourth, referrals should come through 
established and credible networks acting as a first stage filter. Fifth, both group and individual 
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delivery models have merit but individual delivery is essential for certain elements in the 
programme. Sixth, the involvement of potential investors in delivering the support adds 
credibility and realism. Seventh, in order to prevent potential conflicts of interest a formal 
separation is required between the investment readiness programme and the funding process. 
Finally, the delivery team is the critical success factor in terms of their expertise, experience, 
reputation and access to appropriate specialists, networks and investors (SQW, 2004). 
 
ii) University of Warwick Science Park 
A second source of evidence comes from an unpublished paper by David Rowe, Chief Executive 
of the University of Warwick Science Park, which describes an investment readiness programme 
designed to support knowledge-based businesses on the science park to access finance from 
business angels and venture capital funds (Rowe, 2005). This programme was developed in the 
light of the SQW evaluation and designed specifically for early stage knowledge-based 
businesses. The key features of the programme were as follows: 
 A referral network approach to attracting clients – working through intermediaries 
already known to the client. 
 A 1:1 mentoring approach to assessing and working with the company, provided at 
minimal cost to the client. 
 Funding to enable the programme to complement its mentoring with direct assistance in 
the form of interim managers, professional advisors, marketing expertise, etc as 
necessary, along with some seed funding. 
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 Direct access to and involvement with the business angel network and venture capital 
funds as soon as the client‟s mentor deemed the business to have reached a position of 
investability. 
 Where appropriate, providing clients with coaching in presentations at investment forums 
and help in improving the presentation of business plans. 
Funding was provided by the Regional Development Agency and the ERDF. 
 
The various forms of support that businesses in this programme can access – which links to our 
earlier comments about the need to intervene to „fix‟ problems identified by the investment 
readiness programme - is a particularly important feature of the Warwick Science Park 
programme. Companies can access one or more of the following: 
 R&D grants (typically up to €65,000) to help companies complete their product or 
service development programme. 
 Subsidized business advice (up to a total of €5,000) for marketing, technical assistance, 
business planning, intellectual property advice, etc. 
 50% of the cost of an Interim Manager with the key skills necessary to resolve a major 
weakness in the company. This addresses the key problems in many early stage 
companies of the lack of management time and specialized skills. 
 An investment of up to €70,000 of seed capital (from the Concepts Fund) to provide 
working capital to enable the company to reach a higher level of development which, in 
turn, enhances its prospects of raising equity capital (and reduces its cost). In some cases 
the fund has co-invested with external investors as part of an investment package. 
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Businesses which successfully complete their action plans are introduced to private sector 
investors through their mentor. This includes the Science Park‟s own business angel network. Of 
course, some of these businesses will be unsuccessful in raising finance. Others do not reach 
investment ready status for whatever reason. Nevertheless, both of these groups of entrepreneurs 
come out of the programme enriched by the experience which they apply to their business. 
Approximately 35% of the businesses that enter the mentoring phase of the programme receive 
one or more offers of equity finance and secure the investment they are seeking. There has been 
a fourfold increase in the level of investment activity in science park businesses in the two years 
in which the programme has been operational compared with the period before it was launched. 
This performance also compares well with the Investment Readiness Demonstration projects 
evaluated by SQW Limited. Here again, the experience of the programme confirms the SQW 
findings that investment readiness is a long-term intervention. Clients typically take a year or 
more to become investment ready (Rowe, 2005). 
 
iii) Finance Tree’s Finance and Business (F&B) Programme 
The „Finance & Business‟ (F&B) Programme in North East England was delivered by a private 
company, Finance Tree Ltd, on behalf of the North East Regional Development Agency at a cost 
of £2m of public funding. The programme was independently evaluated to show the associate 
benefits, impact and value-added and to help better understand the impact on SMEs over the life 
of the programme and hence contribute to knowledge of best-practice. The evaluation was based 
on a longitudinal tracking of the experiences of business owners. In terms of headline statistics, 
1464 SMEs registered with the programme and 884 received one day or more of assistance.  
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The elements of the F&B programme were specifically designed to meet the proposed three 
distinct dimensions of investment readiness requirements in the Mason and Harrison model: (i) 
entrepreneurs‟ attitudes towards equity finance; (ii) investibility of the project; (iii) 
presentational failings. The F&B programme therefore presented a real opportunity to road-test 
the practicalities of the model, and to identify any other components that would improve the 
design of such investment readiness programmes. Because the F&B programme was one of the 
first major „Access to Finance‟ initiatives, design evolved over time as best-practice 
considerations were incrementally adopted. The resulting investment readiness model was not 
quite as linear in form as the model proposed by Mason and Harrison (2001) (Figure 3). 
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Figure 3. Finance Tree’s Investment Readiness Programme 
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Experience of promoting the programme clearly indicates that the marketing challenge should 
not be under-estimated. It takes time for a programme to develop momentum. The marketing 
budget therefore needs to be substantial. There was a strong emphasis on networking with the 
local private sector (professional services and organisations), public sector (e.g. Business Links, 
Regional Development Agency, other business support), and other specialist knowledge-based 
organisations (e.g. universities, technology incubators), and through media (newspapers, 
magazines, special web articles) to raise awareness of the programme. After the initial tranche of 
publicity, promotion was based on the offer of an introductory course, offer of further 
information/ advice online, and through the use of free online tools all of which were designed to 
stimulate confidence within the entrepreneurial community to embark on the investment 
readiness pathway.  
 
This initiative highlights four major areas concerning the design of investment ready 
programmes.  
 
First, it is critical to ensure that the entrepreneur has a “continuous pathway” towards meeting 
the requirements of investors.  Although the framework of the Programme included the five core 
elements of the Mason and Harrison (2001) model, in practice entrepreneurs could take a „pick 
and mix‟ approach to the programme offering. This might be expected, since entrepreneurs have 
differing requirements. By „picking and mixing‟ entrepreneurs are, in effect, customising the 
service according to their needs. This works with self-motivated entrepreneurs who are well-
informed about all of the elements of the programme and recognised their own needs. But in 
practice, entrepreneurs “don't know what they don't know”. This is one of the reasons why 
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entrepreneurs disengaged from the Programme. Most entrepreneurs therefore prefer a bespoke 
suite of accessible scheduled activities designed by experts to cover what entrepreneurs need to 
know. Thus, the investment readiness journey, by necessity, needs to be both prescriptive and 
linear.  Any mismatch between provision and requirements will create a gap, at which point the 
entrepreneur is in danger of being disengaged from the whole process. Each of the arrows that 
flow between the nodes in Figure 3 have been opportunities to create value-added information 
and/or networking events and clinics. One way in which this has been done is through on-line 
tools which have the advantage of being very accessible.  Examples are FundFinder™, a bespoke 
searchable funding database, and Ask-BIRT™, an online self-assessment investment readiness 
strengths and weakness tool (see Table 1 and Figure 2). If done to a high standard and integrated 
into the marketing strategy, these tools can be effective in attracting participants to the 
programme by providing entrepreneurs with a sample of the “value-add” that investment 
readiness programmes can provide, especially if used in conjunction with the other core 
elements. The initial development and set-up costs are comparably high, but once the tools are 
online, the running costs are minimal. The resulting auto-generated bespoke reports from these 
tools provide a platform to initiate interactions between the entrepreneur and Programme 
advisors/consultants.  
 
The second important lesson learned during the evolution of the Programme concerns the 
customisation of programmes to the requirements of the entrepreneur. For example, additional 
bespoke events were targeted specifically at university science spinout companies (e.g. on 
evaluating the market size for unique high-growth products and services; on intellectual property 
and finance). However, there is a trade-off between the “streaming” of businesses based on their 
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differing needs and the finite resources that are at the disposal of the investment readiness 
programmes. In short, customisation adds considerably to the costs of delivering an investment 
ready programme. 
 
The third lesson was the recognition that the power of local knowledge should not be under-
estimated in setting up and designing an effective programme. Investment readiness teams who 
have good local networks in both the public and private sectors and across all sectors are better 
able to efficiently connect the entrepreneurs with the appropriate sources of expertise (e.g. 
investors, legal, other support networks, etc) within the region. A team with good local 
knowledge and established contacts has the added advantage of being able to identify the types 
of experts from whom local entrepreneurs would want to take advice. Delivery of content by 
experienced consultants and practitioners and by successful high-profile entrepreneurs has been 
an important marketing strategy to achieve high levels of participation at events. 
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The fourth lesson concerns the design of the monitoring processes and targeted reviews. Most 
investment readiness programmes are publicly funded, and this carries with it a duty to 
continuous reporting of various key performance indicators (KPIs) of the Programme. Examples 
of reported indicators include the number of companies receiving specified days of assistance, 
number events hosted, number of participants, new job creation, amount of leveraged finance, 
and in-kind contributions. However, while these KPIs may suit bureaucrats, they are not 
particularly helpful to those engaged in running such programmes. Thus, there is a need to 
develop more meaningful measures to assess the performance and impact of such programmes. 
These might include the following:  
 the amount of interest in, and enthusiasm for, equity finance amongst entrepreneurs; 
 increased knowledge of financing options;  
 programme referrals to other support and finance organisations;  
 amount of business networking at information events;  
 assisting businesses to access various types of funding - grants debt and equity; 
 other benefits for the business: e.g. clearer strategic direction; better financial; 
management  
Such monitoring is required to follow companies on a case-by-case basis, tracking their progress 
towards becoming investment ready.  
 
It was also clear from this programme that an investment readiness programme is not a short-
term process. As already noted, it is likely to take several months, and possibly much longer, to 
deliver the programme and for businesses to address the issues that emerge and become 
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investment ready. This raises two important questions. First, for the purposes of evaluating an 
investment ready programme what is the appropriate monitoring period for the benefits to 
emerge? Second, how long should a programme run to have the most beneficial effect on 
businesses? This has important implications for both the evaluation of the programme and the 
length of time that the programme is funded.   
 
The F&B programme was originally funded for two years but subsequently received funding for 
an additional six months. An evaluation was therefore undertaken at the end of the two-year 
programme. However, a number of stakeholders, quoted in the evaluation, thought that “it was 
too early to make a summative assessment of the impact of the programme on business and 
regional development”. The Finance Tree evaluation, which was based on the longitudinal 
tracking of the initial cohort of clients found that 18 months after the start of the programme, 
27% of businesses identified a positive change in their business, but this increased to 52% six 
months later, with businesses reporting (after 24 months) an aggregate increase in turnover of 
£1.68m, 31 new jobs created, over £1m in new funding (by 22 businesses) and £186,960 from in-
kind contributions from the public sector. This provides clear evidence that the benefits of an 
investment readiness programme take time to emerge. Moreover, these figures understate the 
positive impact of the programme because they do not record the benefits beyond 24 months, nor 
the impact on those companies that had joined the programme more than 12 months after the 
start. 
 
The programme had to close once its funding ceased. It operated for just 30 months. This may be 
seen as an inefficient use of public resources. First, there are substantial sunk costs incurred in 
 
 
32 
 
setting up such a programme. Consequently, they need to run over a number of years to justify 
such costs. Second, the programme took time to develop momentum, raise awareness and 
achieve a positive reputation. It also takes time for those involved in the programme to develop 
knowledge and learning which can be translated into good practice. Closure after such a short 
period of time therefore significantly reduces the return that the programme generates from the 
investment of public funds. The implication is therefore that investment ready programmes 
should be funded with a view to being operational for several years if they are to achieve a step 
change in the quality of the deal-flow reaching equity investors. Moreover, the closure of the 
programme creates a need which in due course is filled by other publicly funded investment 
ready programmes which have to start from scratch because the learning from the previous 
programme – mainly in the form of the tacit knowledge of the individuals involved - has 
dispersed. 
 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
There is now a growing recognition that improving the access of SMEs to finance is not 
exclusively a supply-side issue. The impact of an increase in the supply of early stage venture 
capital will be limited because many of the businesses that come forward are not investment 
ready. The consequences are, first, that investors are unable to make as many investments, or 
invest as much as they wish, and second, that investors who are under pressure to invest (such as 
government funds) will invest in poor quality businesses in order to „get money out the door‟. 
This recognition has prompted various organisations, often with government support, to develop 
investment ready schemes. These comprise three distinct elements: (i) finding out – seminars 
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which provide information on the types of finance available, the role of different types of finance 
in growing a business and the specific role and importance of equity finance and where it can be 
sourced (ii) becoming investment ready – workshops and tailored support to enable business 
owners understand what investors look for and how to address these issues in their own business; 
and (iii) finding and attracting investors – training in presentational skills and connections to 
potential investors. It would be appropriate, in order to emphasise the connectivity between the 
creation of new investment funds and investment readiness, for the investors in new venture 
capital funds to set aside a proportion of funds under management (say 5%) to establish 
independently-run investment readiness programmes. Indeed, the £125m JEREMIE fund in 
North East England has an investment readiness programme built in to address the deal flow for 
its six equity funds.  
 
This review has highlighted three lessons for policy makers considering the introduction of 
investment ready schemes. First, they are not a quick fix. Positive results will be slow to emerge. 
Momentum takes time to build, the advisory team takes time to build up expertise and the 
reputation of the programme takes time to develop. Thus, a properly designed programme needs 
to funded for several years. Second, investment ready projects involve significant costs to the 
public purse and cannot be expected to recoup their costs from users. Third, the Mason and 
Harrison (2001) model appears to be fairly robust. Programmes which deliver the awareness and 
presentation elements but do not effectively engage in the (more costly) critical diagnostic and 
business support components are unlikely to be effective. What is being delivered in such 
programmes is necessary but is not sufficient to get businesses investment ready. This is because 
investment readiness is fundamentally about business development issues, is often nebulous and 
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generally company-specific and requires the input of significant amounts of expertise to identify 
and address barriers to investment. As a consequence, such support is time-consuming and, 
therefore, expensive to deliver (and, of course, well beyond the means of most start-up and early 
stage companies to purchase themselves). Finally, an important modification to the original 
Mason-Harrison (2001) investment readiness model is connections to other business support 
programmes that offer assistance to address the sorts of issues identified in the investment 
readiness review that need to be addressed to make the business investment ready. 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Blatt, R and Riding, A. (1996) Where angels fear to tread? Some lessons from the Canada 
Opportunities Investment Network. In R. T. Harrison and C. M. Mason, (eds)  Informal 
Venture Capital: evaluating the impact of business introduction services (Prentice Hall, 
Hemel Hempstead), pp 75-88. 
Clark, C (2008) The impact of entrepreneurs‟ oral „pitch‟ presentation skills on business angels‟ 
initial screening investment decisions, Venture Capital: An International Journal of 
Entrepreneurial Finance,10, 257-279. 
Douglas, E J and Shepherd, D (2002) Exploring investor readiness: assessments by entrepreneurs 
and investors in Australia, Venture Capital: An International Journal of Entrepreneurial 
Finance, 4, 219-236. 
Ernst and Young/Centre for Innovation and Enterprise (1997) Investment Readiness Study 
(Department of Industry, Science and Tourism, Canberra). 
Feeney, L, Haines, G H jr and Riding, A R (1999) Private investors‟ investment criteria: insights 
from qualitative data, Venture Capital: An International Journal of Entrepreneurial 
Finance, 1, 121-145. 
Gumpert, D E (2003) Burn Your Business Plan. What Investors Really Want From 
Entrepreneurs (Lauson Publishing: Needham, MA). 
Howorth, C (2001) Small firms‟ demand for finance: a research note, International Small 
Business Journal, 19 (4), 78-86. 
Hutchinson, R W (1995) The capital structure and investment decisions of the small owner-
managed firm: some exploratory issues, Small Business Economics, 7 (3), 231-239. 
Kawasaki, G (2004) The Art of the Start (Portfolio: New York) 
Lumme, A., Mason, C. and Suomi, M. (1998) Informal Venture Capital: Investors, Investments 
and Policy Issues in Finland (Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, Netherlands). 
Marsden Jacobs Associates (1995) Financing Growth (Canberra: National Investment Council, 
Department of Industry, Science and Technology). 
Mason, C. M. and Harrison, R. T. (1994) The informal venture capital market in the UK. In  A. 
Hughes and D.J. Storey (eds.) Financing Small Firms Routledge, London, pp 64-111. 
 
 
35 
 
Mason, C. M. and Harrison, R. T., (1996a) LINC: A decentralised approach to the promotion of 
informal venture capital. In R. T. Harrison and C. M. Mason (eds) Informal Venture 
Capital: evaluating the impact of business introduction services, Prentice Hall, Hemel 
Hempstead, pp 119-141. 
Mason, C. M. and Harrison, R. T. (1996b), Why business angels say no: A case study of 
opportunities rejected by an informal investor syndicate. International Small Business 
Journal, 14 (2): 35-51. 
Mason, C M and Harrison, R T (1999) Public policy and the development of the informal 
venture capital market: UK experience and lessons for Europe, in K Cowling (ed.) 
Industrial Policy in Europe, London: Routledge, pp 199-223. 
Mason, C M and Harrison, R T (2001) Investment readiness: a critique of government proposals 
to increase the demand for venture capital, Regional Studies, 35, 663-668. 
Mason, C M and Harrison, R T (2002) Barriers to investment in the informal venture capital 
sector‟, Entrepreneurship and Regional Development, 14, 271-287. 
Mason, C M and Harrison, R T (2003) „Auditioning for money‟: what do technology investors 
look for at the initial screening stage? Journal of Private Equity, 6 (2), 29-42. 
Mason, C. M. and Harrison, R. T., (2004) Improving access to early stage venture capital in 
regional economies: a new approach to investment readiness. Local Economy, 19: 159-173. 
Mason, C. and Rogers, A. (1996) Understanding the Business Angel’s Investment Decision. 
Venture Finance Working Paper No. 14, University of Southampton and University of 
Ulster, Southampton. 
Mason, C. and Rogers, A. (1997) The business angel‟s investment decision: an exploratory 
analysis, in D Deakins, P. Jennings and C Mason (eds.) Entrepreneurship in the 1990’s 
London: Paul Chapman Publishing, pp. 29-46. 
Myers, S (1984) The capital structure puzzle, Journal of Finance, 39, 575-592. 
Oakey, R P (2007)  A commentary on gaps in funding for moderate „non-stellar‟ growth small 
businesses in the United Kingdom, Venture Capital: An International Journal of 
Entrepreneurial Finance, 9 (3), 223-235. 
Paul, S, Whittam, G and Johnston, J B (2003) The operation of the informal venture capital 
market in Scotland, Venture Capital: An International Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance, 
5, 313-335. 
Ready for Equity (2008) Training for Business Angels and Entrepreneurs: mapping exercise, 
Brussels: European Commission: Education and Culture. 
Riding, A. L., Dal Cin, P., Duxbury, L., Haines, G. and Safrata, R. (1993) Informal Investors in 
Canada: The Identification of Salient Characteristics. Carleton University, Ottawa. 
Rowe, D N E (2005) Investment readiness: the new tool for bringing equity markets and high 
growth SMEs together at an early stage. Coventry: University of Warwick Science Park. 
Shane, S (2009) Why encouraging more people to become entrepreneurs is bad policy, Small 
Business Economics, 33 (2), 141-149. 
Shepherd, D and Douglas, E (1999) Attracting Equity Investors: Positioning, Preparing and 
Presenting the Business Plan: Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
SQW Limited (2004) Evaluation of the Investment Readiness Demonstration Projects and 
Fit4Finance. Final report to the Small Business Service. SWQ Limited: Cambridge. 
Stedler, H. R. and Peters, H. H. (2003) Business Angels In Germany: An Empirical Study. 
Venture Capital: An International Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance, 5: 269-276. 
 
 
36 
 
Van Auken, H.E. (2001) Financing small technology-baaed companies: the relationship between 
familiarity with capital and ability to price and negotiate investment, Journal of Small 
Business Management, 39 (3), 240358. 
Zu Knyphausen-Aufseβ D and Westphal, R (2008) Do business angel networks deliver value to 
business angels? Venture Capital: An International Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance,10 
(2), 149-169.  
